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ABSTRACT
This paper considers the question of whether raising capital is an important reason why firms go
public. Using a sample of 16,958 initial public offerings from 38 countries between 1990 and 2003,
we consider differences between firms that sell new, primary shares to the public, and existing
secondary shares that previously belonged to insiders. Our results suggest that the sale of primary
shares is correlated with a number of factors associated with the firm's demand for capital. In
particular, issuance of primary shares is correlated with higher increases of investment, higher
repayment of debt and increases in cash, and more subsequent capital-raising through seasoned
equity offers. Since 79% of all capital raised through IPOs in our sample is from the sale of primary
shares, we conclude that capital-raising is an important motive in the going-public decision.
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An initial public offering (IPO) is generally perceived as one of the most important milestones in 
a firm’s lifecycle.  It allows the firm to access the public equity markets for additional capital necessary to 
fund future growth, while simultaneously providing a venue for the initial shareholders to sell their 
ownership stake.  From investors’ perspective, an IPO provides a popular choice for investors, although 
the wisdom of investing in them has been challenged by academic evidence (see Ritter (1991)).  It is no 
wonder that IPOs, especially the large ones, draw so much attention from the press.    
Reflecting the importance of the going public decision, the academic literature on IPOs has been 
voluminous.  Yet, perhaps surprisingly, the vast majority of empirical literature has ignored the 
underlying reasons why firms go public.  Instead, it has focused on the underpricing, the long-run 
performance, and the time-clustering of IPOs (see Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) or Ritter (2003) for 
surveys).  Of the recent theoretical papers on the going-public decision, Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999) 
focus on the capital-raising aspect of an IPO while Zingales (1995) and Mello and Parsons (1998) 
emphasize the sale of executives’ shares and eventual change of control.  The extent to which these 
various explanations explain actual firms’ reasons for going public is largely unexplored. 
The likely reason why there has been so little empirical work addressing the reasons for going 
public is that the most straightforward way to study the issue would be to compare the characteristics of 
firms that chose to go public with the firms that remained private.  However, such a study would require 
extensive data on private firms, which generally are not available.  One paper that is able to use this 
approach is Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998) (PPZ), which utilizes a database containing information 
on 69 Italian firms that went public between 1982 and 1992, as well as a number of private Italian firms 
that did not go public but met the listing requirements of the public exchanges during the same time 
period.  These authors conclude firms in their sample choose to go public not to finance future 
investments and growth, but rather to rebalance their leverage and to allow the managers to liquidate their 




Although these findings may hold for the sample considered by PPZ, it is not obvious that their 
results automatically extend to other countries and periods.  For example, Mikkelson et al. (1997) 
document that US IPOs are generally followed by a large growth in assets.  While Mikkelson et al. 
contains no explicit linkage between the firms’ growth to the capital raising involved with the IPO, this 
finding is at least suggestive of the view that firms go public so that they can raise public equity capital to 
finance growth.  To understand the motivations behind going public, one must consider a larger sample 
than that used by PPZ, preferably from a number of different countries.  Unfortunately, the kind of data 
on private companies that PPZ have access to is not readily available for most countries.  Therefore, one 
must use an alternative approach. 
One such approach is to consider cross-sectional patterns in a sample of IPOs.  IPOs differ along 
many dimensions; a particularly useful one for this purpose is the identity of the shares being offered to 
the public for sale.  Some IPOs involve primary offerings of new shares, while others consist of the 
secondary sale of shares already held by insiders.  A third group is made up of a combination of primary 
and secondary offerings.  It seems plausible that differences between primary and secondary offerings 
could reflect differences in the underlying motivation of the IPO.  In particular, IPOs that involve 
secondary offerings are likely to be driven by a desire for liquidity by the firm’s executives, while 
primary offerings are more likely to reflect a demand for capital.
1  Of course these explanations are not 
mutually exclusive.  Any IPO, even one in which the primary motive is to raise capital, nonetheless 
provides liquidity for executives and an IPO done as a secondary offering also allows the firm to raise 
equity capital from public markets subsequently.   
This paper attempts to provide some insights into the underlying motives for IPOs by considering 
differences between the primary, secondary and combined offerings.  We test the hypothesis that primary 
offerings are related to factors associated with the demand for capital, such as subsequent investment and 
                                                 
1  Existing theoretical models do not seem to incorporate these differential motives simultaneously.    For example, 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri(1999)’s model considers sale of primary shares to fund a new investment project, while  
Zingales(1995) and Mello and Parsons(1998) focus on the sale of secondary shares and does not model new 




seasoned equity offers.  The extent to which primary offerings are correlated in the data with factors 
related to demand for capital measures the extent to which these offerings are motivated to raise capital.  
In contrast, if secondary offerings are not associated with demand for capital by the firm, they are likely 
motivated by factors that we cannot measure, such as executives’ desire for liquidity. 
  First, we examine the distribution of types of shares offered at IPOs across countries using a 
sample of 16,958 IPOs from 38 countries between 1990 and 2003.  We find that the proportion of 
secondary shares is the highest in European countries and the lowest in Asian countries excluding Japan.  
The differences between countries and across regions seem economically large and potentially reflect 
important differences in the economic institutions of these countries. 
We next relate the types of IPO offerings with the subsequent increases in various accounting 
variables that are likely related to future investment and a firm’s financial condition.  We find that 
primary only offerings have the highest increases in all the variables, followed by combined offerings and 
secondary only offerings.  Moreover, the value of the primary offerings, normalized by assets, is 
significantly correlated with increases in inventory, net property, plant and equipment (PPE), capital 
expenditure and R & D expenditure up to four years after the IPO even after controlling for firm size, as 
well as year, country, and industry fixed effects. In contrast, the value of the secondary offerings is 
substantially less related to these variables.  These findings suggest that a motivation for using primary 
offerings is to raise capital, while IPOs done as secondary offerings reflect other motivations. 
We estimate the increase in a number of alternative accounting variables that represent possible 
uses of the capital raised at the IPO.  The largest increase is for cash holdings; for every dollar raised in 
the IPO, cash holdings rise by 68.8 cents per dollar raised in the year after the IPO.  This decreases to 
50.0 cents over a four-year period after the IPO as the money is spent on various projects.  The largest 
expenditures appear to be on R&D and capital expenditures, which increase by 17.1 cents and 8.3 cents 
respectively per dollar raised in the year following the IPO, and by 88.2 cents and 38.7 cents over a four-
year period.  In addition, inventory rises as well (2.3 cents in the first year and 5.3 cents over a four-year 




We examine the extent to which these findings hold across geographical regions, and between 
civil and common law countries.  We find that firms in all countries appear to rely on IPOs to raise capital 
to finance investment, although there are some differences across regions and legal regimes. 
Finally, we examine the extent to which IPO offer type is related to subsequent capital raising.  
We first find that primary-only IPOs are generally followed by primary-only seasoned equity offerings 
(SEOs) and secondary-only IPOs are generally followed by secondary-only SEOs.  In particular, 65% of 
SEOs that followed primary-only IPOs are also primary only and 64% of SEOs that followed secondary-
only IPOs are also secondary only.  This finding supports the view that secondary offerings are more 
related with liquidity motives.  We also measure the value of capital raised following IPOs, and find that 
the proportion of new capital out of total proceeds raised through SEOs is the highest for primary only 
IPOs, followed by combined and secondary only IPOs.  This finding holds both in a univariate setting, 
and in a multivariate framework controlling for other relevant factors.  These results show that both the 
probability and the magnitude of subsequently raised fresh new capital following an IPO are positively 
correlated with the relative proportion of primary offerings in the initial public offering.  Presumably, the 
IPOs done to raise capital as primary offerings are from firms with an ongoing demand for capital; 
subsequent to the offering these firms are likely to reenter the equity market to raise more capital.  In 
contrast, when IPOs are done as secondary offerings for liquidity motives, then the firm is less likely to 
have an ongoing demand for capital, so subsequent offerings are less likely to involve raising new capital. 
Overall, the results are consistent with the view that initial public offerings, when done through a 
primary offering, are motivated in large part to raise capital.  Firms doing primary offerings tend to have 
higher increases in capital expenditures and R&D than firms doing secondary offerings.  Subsequent to 
the IPO, they raise more capital through SEOs than do firms doing secondary offerings.  Since 79.4% of 
the money raised in initial public offerings is through primary offerings, our findings suggest that demand 
for capital is a primary motive for going public.   
Our results also have implications for the overall view of equity markets as a capital-raising tool.  




civil law countries, equity markets are not used very commonly to raise capital.  Our findings suggest an 
alternative conclusion; in these countries firms raise substantial quantities of equity capital through initial 
public offerings.  When they do so, they predominately use primary offerings, the proceeds of which are 
then used to finance new investment. 
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows:  Section I describes our data source and our sample. 
Section II provides distribution of IPO offer types across the 38 countries.  Section III presents the 
distribution of subsequent increases in assets and expenditures for each of the 3 IPO offer types and 
examines the relationship between IPO type and the increase.  Section IV examines the effect of IPO offer 
type on the probability and magnitude of subsequent capital raising activity.  Section V is a short 
conclusion.    
 
I.  Data Sources and Sample Description 
A. Data  Sources 
We obtain our IPO data from SDC Global New Issues Database. This database provides 
information on total proceeds and the number of primary and secondary shares offered for each IPO and 
SEO.  WorldScope provides the accounting data for our sample IPOs.  We augment WorldScope with 
Standard and Poor’s Xpressfeed, which provides US and international data comparable to Compustat.  
SDC has very limited coverage for non-US IPO’s prior to 1990, so we set our sample period to be from 
January 1990 to December 2003. 
From all IPOs reported in SDC, we first filter out those that do not have information on total 
number of shares or the composition of primary and secondary shares.  We also exclude IPOs where the 
total amount of proceeds is inconsistent with the offer price and the number of shares offered by more 
than $5 million.  A total of 2,301 IPOs were dropped using these initial filters.  We then exclude the 
following firms from our sample:  
(a)  All utilities (3 digit SIC's from 491 to 494) : 250 IPOs 




(c)  All privatizations : 173 IPOs.
2 
(d)  All telecoms(2 digit SIC 48): 655 IPOs
3 
(e)  All transition economies: 1,117 IPOs from China, Hungary and Poland 
(f)  All nations with fewer than 10 IPO's during the sample period: 89 IPOs from 32 countries 
 
       These requirements are imposed to identify a sample of non-regulated private firms that go 
public.
4  After applying these filters, we end up with 16,958 IPOs in 38 countries, each occurring between 
1990 and 2003.
5 
B. IPOs around the World 
Table I presents descriptive statistics of our global IPO sample.  Panel A presents the number of 
IPOs and panel B shows the total proceeds raised through IPOs for each region and year in our sample.  
The U.S. is by far the largest IPO market, accounting for 27% of all IPOs and 45% of total proceeds.
6   
European IPOs are somewhat modest both in numbers and amount in early 1990’s, but start to pick up in 
the mid 1990’s and surpass US in the number of total IPOs by late 1990’s.  Asian IPOs peak in mid 
1990’s and then drop significantly in 1998-99 after the financial crisis of 1997.    Although Asian IPOs 
comprise 37% in terms of numbers, they only account for 12% of the total proceeds, implying that Asian 
IPOs are generally smaller on average than other IPOs.
7   
                                                 
2 The privatizations are identified from Boutchkova and Megginson (2000), Belke and Schneider (2003), and 
Hoover's Online.  For all IPOs which raised more than $100 million that are not identified as privatizations in the 
previous two papers, we manually checked Hoover’s Online to verify whether the IPO was a privatization or not.  
For those IPOs that were not identified on Hoover’s Online, we checked the company’s website if it had one as of 
June 2004. 
3 Many of the telecom IPOs overlap with privatizations.  When they do not, they tend to be very large joint ventures 
between existing telecom giants. 
4 Cross listings such as ADR/ADS, GDR/GDS, or direct cross listings are included in the sample as long as it is 
done concurrently with the domestic IPO or it is the first listing in any public exchange.  Multiple issues are counted 
as one IPO, and the total amount as well as the number of shares are aggregated after adjusting for differences in 
offer prices. 
5 Roughly two-thirds of these IPOs do not have accounting information just prior to an IPO, partly because our 
accounting data stops at 2001.  We drop these IPOs in sections III and IV, but include them in section II. 
6  The amount raised through ADR/ADSs is included in the country of origin rather than in the U.S.  Canadian 
domestic IPOs from 1990 to 1992 are all dropped according to the initial filter, and their coverage stops at 2001 in 
our dataset. 
7 Almost 60% of Asian IPOs are from India, and Indian IPOs tend to be very small.  The median value of proceeds 




II. Distribution of IPO offer types 
IPOs vary along a number of dimensions, an important one of which is the type of shares being 
sold to the public.  Firms have a choice of selling new, ‘primary’ shares, or existing, ‘secondary’ shares. 
A primary offering increases the number of shares outstanding and raises capital for the firm, while 
secondary offerings keep the number of shares outstanding constant and has no revenue consequences to 
the firm.  A third type of offering is a combination of the two, selling some new shares and some 
previously-owned shares. 
Table II presents statistics on the three types of IPOs in our sample.  Panel A shows the number 
of IPOs that belong in each of the three categories, and panel B presents total proceeds from each type.  
Panel B also separates combined offerings into primary shares and secondary shares and reports the 
proceeds for each type within the combined category.  Clearly, primary offerings are the most common, 
comprising 76.2% of all offerings.  Pure secondary offerings are relatively uncommon, making up only 
1.7% of the sample, while the remaining 22.2% are combinations of primary and secondary offerings. 
Table II indicates that there are noticeable differences across countries and regions.  For example, 
most of the Asian IPOs offer primary shares only.  Except for Japan, Hong Kong and Singapore, where 
the financial markets are the most developed, primary only IPOs are well over 90% of the total IPOs in 
Asia.  Secondary only offerings are extremely rare in this region.  Even combined offerings are not 
common except in Japan and Hong Kong.   
Compared to Asian IPOs, European IPOs exhibit relatively higher percentages of secondary only 
offerings, and lower percentage of primary only offerings.  These differences probably reflect differences 
in the institutional environment and are consistent with the high rate of secondary offerings in Europe that 
has been documented elsewhere.  In the PPZ sample, for example, of the 69 IPOs, only 28 were primary-
only offerings.  Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) report that 67% of IPOs in Portugal and 23% in 
Germany were entirely secondary in the 1980s and early 1990s.  In addition, Jenkinson and Ljungqvist 
report that European IPOs have begun using a higher proportion of primary offerings since the early 




the recent change towards primary offerings within Europe, suggest that perhaps the conclusions of PPZ 
should be reexamined, since that study contains only 69 IPOs from one European country from the 1980s. 
We can infer the value raised from primary shares and secondary shares respectively by 
separating out the proceeds from the combined category into those raised from primary shares and those 
raised from secondary shares and adding them back into proceeds from primary only and secondary only 
offerings.  The last five columns of panel B in table II presents these calculations.  Overall, 79% of the 
total proceeds are fresh new capital raised through primary shares.  However, there are distinct cross-
country variations.  Except for Japan and Malaysia, roughly 90% or more of the total proceeds in Asian 
IPOs are fresh new capital.  In contrast, the proportion of fresh capital is smaller in European countries.  
The lowest proportion is in France and Spain, where less than 60% of the total amount raised is from 
primary shares.   The U.S. falls between Europe and Asia, with 82% of capital being raised from primary 
shares. 
 
III. IPO Offer Type and Subsequent Growth 
A. Univariate Analysis of Changes in Accounting Variables across IPO Offer Types 
Presumably, there are a number of reasons why firms differ in the type of shares they offer in an 
IPO.  The large differences across countries undoubtedly reflect institutional features of the particular 
markets.  Yet, in addition to these institutional features, it seems plausible that the underlying reasons for 
going public will also affect the choice of what type of shares will be offered in an IPO.  In particular, if a 
firm chooses to go public so that its managers can sell their shares, we expect that the firm is likely to use 
a secondary or combined offering.  On the other hand, if it is going public to raise capital to be able to 
fund investments or to rebalance its capital structure, then it likely would use a primary offering. 
Our goal is to examine the view that differences in the underlying objectives of firms will lead to 
differences in the types of shares being offered.   
We first compare the types of offers with changes in characteristics plausibly associated with 




future investment and growth:  total assets, inventory, net PPE, capital expenditure, R&D, cash, and 
reduction in long-term debt.  To minimize the impact of outliers, we focus on a logarithmic 
transformation of each variable.  For balance sheet items (total assets, inventory, net PPE and cash), we 
calculate the log of one plus the change in each variable normalized by total assets prior to the IPO: 
() ] 1 )   ln[( 0 0 + − assets total V Vt , where V is the variable being measured, and years are normalized so that 
year 0 is the fiscal year end just prior to the IPO and year t denotes number of years after year 0.  For 
income statement and cash flow statement items (capital expenditure, R&D and reduction in long-term 
debt), we consider the log of one plus the accumulation in each variable since the IPO, normalized by 
total assets prior to the IPO:   ] 1 ) 0   1 ln[( + ∑ = assets total t
i i V . As a consequence of this transformation, the 
resulting distribution of each variable is more symmetric than it is without the transformation.   
Table III reports the means and medians of this normalized increase for each variable, broken 
down by IPO offer type.  This table computes these changes for periods between one year and four years 
in length.  It also presents t-statistics for comparisons of means between the primary-only and combined 
groups, and between the combined and secondary-only groups.
8   
Except for a few cases, increases are the largest in the primary only group, followed by the 
combined group.  IPOs that only offer secondary shares exhibit the lowest increases in most cases.  
Moreover, these differences in increases in these variables between IPO offer types are generally 
statistically significant.   
The accounting variables from Table III can be grouped into three categories, reflecting firm size 
(total assets and inventory), investments (net property plant and equipment, capital expenditures, and 
research and development), and financial flexibility (cash and long term debt reduction).
9   The relation 
between the increases of each category of variables and the type of shares offered can be interpreted 
relatively easily. 
                                                 
8 The bold letters in this table and in subsequent tables indicate statistical significance at less than the 5% level. 
9 Capital expenditures and reduction in long-term debt are directly taken from the cash flow statement, and reflect 




The correlation between IPO type and the increases in the size variables (total assets and 
inventory) probably reflects that primary offers are used at the fastest growing firms.  Firms that are 
growing the fastest probably have the greatest demand for external capital, to pay for both direct 
investments and indirect investments in activities such as advertising, as well as to fund increased 
working capital that could be reflected in the increases of inventories. 
While the correlation between increase in size and IPO type could come through a number of 
channels, the correlation between the increases in the investment variables (net PPE, capital expenditures, 
and research and development) and the type of IPO provides more direct evidence.  In particular, it seems 
likely that firms increasing investments most rapidly have the greatest demand for capital, and thus 
choose to issue primary shares when they go public.  A desire to fund investments in capital expenditures, 
research and development, as well as elements of net property, plant and equipment could lead some 
firms to go public.  In contrast, firms that go public to allow managers to cash out through secondary 
offers will have, on average, a lower demand for capital.  As a result, we could observe the pattern 
documented in Table III, in which primary offers are associated with higher increases in investment than 
secondary offers. 
Finally, both the increases in cash holdings and cash outflows used to reduce long-term debt are 
consistent with the view expressed by PPZ that firms go public to rebalance their capital structure.  Firms 
wanting to pay down debt or keep cash in reserve to preserve financial flexibility issue primary shares 
when they go public to raise capital for this purpose.  Consistent with this finding, the companies that 
issue primary shares have the highest average debt to total capital ratios (0.75 vs. 0.68 for combined 
offers and 0.62 for secondary offers) while after they go public, the order is reversed, the firms issuing 
primary offers having the lowest debt to total capital ratios (0.37 for primary, 0.40 for combined, and 0.59 
for secondary).   
In summary, the differences in normalized increases in the seven variables across different types 




motivations for going public.  Firms issuing primary shares appear to use the capital both to increase 
investment, and to increase financial flexibility, presumably to be able to fund future investments.   
Yet, while these comparisons are suggestive, they omit at least four potentially important 
considerations.  First, Table II documents that type of IPO is highly correlated with the place of issue and 
accounting variables are likely to be so as well, for no other reason than the fact that accounting is done 
differently in different countries.  Second, Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) suggest that there has been a 
secular trend towards primary issues at least in Europe, which should be controlled for econometrically.  
Third, the univariate comparisons make no use of the quantity of equity that is issued, which certainly 
could affect the use of the funds.  Finally, we do not consider differences within the ‘combined’ category; 
presumably a firm that issues 99% primary shares and 1% secondary is different from one that issues 99% 
secondary and 1% primary.  We next consider the normalized increases in our accounting variables in a 
mutivariate setting, controlling for these factors. 
B.  Multivariate Analysis of Changes in Accounting Variables across IPO Offer Types  
To analyze the relation between IPO type and increases in the seven accounting variables, we use 
a continuous rather than a discrete characterization of IPOs.  This approach allows us to analyze explicitly 
the relative proportion and values of secondary and primary shares.  The hypothesis we test is that once 
other relevant factors are controlled for, a dollar of new capital raised through a primary issue is 
associated with a larger change in each accounting variable than a dollar going to managers through a 
secondary issue.   
To test this hypothesis, we consider two alternative specifications.  The first enters different kinds 
of capital separately, to examine whether each kind of capital has a different effect on each accounting 
variable.  For convenience, we will refer to the proceeds from primary shares as ‘primary capital’ and 
proceeds from the secondary shares as ‘secondary capital’.  In particular, we estimate:  
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where Y =  () ] 1 )   ln[( 0 0 + − assets total V Vt  for V  = total assets, inventory, net PPE or cash, and   
              =  ] 1 ) 0   1 ln[( + ∑ = assets total t
i i V  for V  = capital expenditure, R&D or reduction in LT debt. 
FE represents fixed effects and includes dummy variables for year, country and 2 digit SIC codes to 
control for time, country and industry specific effects.  Log of total assets is also included as an additional 
control variable to capture any potential size related effect.  We estimate this equation measuring changes 
in accounting variables for varying periods of time up to four years after the IPO.  In each case, each 
variable is normalized by the book value of assets prior to the IPO.
10   
Second, we consider a specification in which we enter the fraction of primary shares sold out of 
total shares sold as an independent variable.  This ratio equals one if only primary shares are offered, and 
zero if only secondary shares are offered.  Combined offerings have values between zero and one, with 
mostly primary offerings being closer to one and mostly secondary being closer to zero.  We estimate:     











 ⋅ = FE ] assets   ln[total
assets   total
proceeds   total
ln
offered   shares   total
offered   shares primary 
0 3
0
2 1 Y                    (2) 
In addition to the fraction of primary shares sold, we also control for the proceeds of the IPO, scaled by 
the company size, and also log of total assets as well as year, country and industry fixed effects. A finding 
that the relative proportion of primary shares affects the increases in the accounting variables would 
suggest that in cases where the firm issues primary shares, it does so at least partially to raise new capital. 
Specification (1) is structured to examine which of the two, the fresh capital raised or the 
proceeds from the sale of secondary shares, has a larger effect on subsequent growth.  Therefore, we 
compare the relative magnitudes of β1 and β2 and test if the difference between the two is statistically 
significantly different from zero.  Specification (2) is focused directly on whether the fraction of primary 
shares explains the increases in our dependent variables, once we control for the size of the IPO relative 
to firm size.  The value of fresh capital equals total proceeds multiplied by the relative proportion of 
primary shares, and the value of secondary shares sold equals total proceeds multiplied by one minus this 
                                                 
10 We exclude those IPOs where the value of the total asset prior to the IPO is less than 5% of the total proceeds 




ratio.  Thus, Specification (1) puts emphasis on combined effect of the relative proportion of primary 
shares and total proceeds, whereas Specification (2) aims at picking up the pure effect of this proportion, 
independent of the relative size of IPO.
11   
Table IV presents estimates of these equations, but does not report the country, year, and industry 
fixed effects for the sake of brevity.  Panel A of Table IV, containing estimates of Specification (1), 
indicates that fresh capital has a much stronger relation with the increases of all seven dependent variables 
than does the proceeds from secondary shares.  The effect of fresh capital on the normalized changes in 
the accounting variables is positive and statistically significantly different from zero in each specification.  
In contrast, the coefficient on secondary capital is substantially and statistically smaller in each 
specification and is generally close to zero, although it is statistically positive in some specifications.  
This effect is consistent with the capital raising motivation for the IPO, as the firms with increasing 
expenditures are the ones raising primary rather than secondary capital.  It also suggests that our equation 
is picking up the uses of the funds and not some spurious relation arising from econometric 
misspecification. 
This pattern is confirmed by the estimates of Specification (2) in Panel B of Table IV.  In this 
specification, we include the log of proceeds normalized by assets, as well as the fraction of primary 
shares in the offering.  With each choice of dependent variable, the coefficient on the relative proportion 
of primary shares is positive and significantly different from zero, suggesting that primary shares are 
positively related to increases in accounting variables.  In addition, the coefficient on the log of proceeds 
is consistently positive.  The results from this panel confirm that firms increase their expenditures when 
proceeds are higher in the IPO, and when fresh capital is brought into the firm.  
Comparing the coefficients for the equations representing different time horizons used in 
computing the dependent variables, there is a consistent pattern.  For the equations representing changes 
in expenditures on inventory, PPE, capital expenditures, and R&D, the coefficients on primary capital 
                                                 
11 We have also estimated these equations including firm age as another independent variable with similar results.  
This variable is only available for approximately 1/3 of the sample, so we choose to report the results without this 




(from Panel A) and on proceeds (from Panel B) are all increasing over time.  This pattern suggests that 
the capital raised is not used all at once but rather partially saved and used in the future.  Consistent with 
this pattern is the fact that the corresponding coefficients on changes in cash holdings have the opposite 
pattern in each table. These coefficients decrease with the time horizon of the dependent variables, 
suggesting that firms initially hold the capital as cash and pay it down over time. 
A useful way to compare the effects of new cash across different uses is to calculate from each 
equation the change in the accounting variable implied from a dollar increase in new capital.  This value 
provides a consistent way of comparing the relative importance of alternative uses of the cash raised.
12 
We present the results of this calculation in Panel A of Table IV.
13  For the total assets variable, the 
implied changes are all close to 1, which is not surprising since the book value of assets mechanically 
increases dollar for dollar whenever new capital is raised.  Nonetheless, the fact that the implied change in 
assets for a dollar raised is close to a dollar suggests that the specification we use is picking up real rather 
than spurious effects.   
For the other variables, the implied change per dollar raised is largest for the change in cash 
holdings.  In year 1, firms hold 68.8 cents in cash for every dollar they raise, decreasing over time to 50 
cents.  The implied fraction spent on inventory, net PPE, capital expenditures, R&D, and debt reduction 
all increases over time.  This effect is likely due to firms spending cash acquired in the IPO over a several 
year time period, as well as to firms that raise primary capital being more likely to raise subsequent 
capital in the years following the IPO.   
This calculation also provides insights into the relative use of the funds raised in the IPO.  In the 
first year after the IPO, it implies that for every dollar raised, R&D increases by 17.1 cents, capital 
                                                 
12 The calculations are based on a median-sized firm in 1996 in US with 2 digit SIC 73 (business services).  For 
example, dollar changes in inventory for t = 1 is calculated as follows:  Median primary capital is 24, median 
secondary capital is 0, and median total assets prior to IPO are 24.453. (All units are in $US mil). Using these inputs 
together with coefficients from table IV yields -0.00083 as the predicted value of the log transformation, implying a 
predicted change of -0.0203 in inventory.  Then we add one to median primary capital and repeat the above 
procedure, which results in a predicted change of 0.00251 in inventory.  The difference in the two predicted changes 
represents the dollar changes in inventory for 1 unit increase in primary capital, which is given by 0.02281.  
13 We restrict this calculation to Specification (1) because to do so in Specification (2) would be complicated by the 
fact that an extra dollar of primary capital would affect both the relative proportion of primary shares and total 




expenditures by 8.3 cents, net PPE by 9.3 cents, inventory by 2.3 cents, and debt is reduced by 4.2 cents.  
These numbers rise over time, so that over a four-year period, for each dollar raised in the IPO, R&D rises 
by 88.2 cents, capital expenditures by 38.7 cents, PPE by 24.8 cents, inventory by 5.3 cents, and debt is 
reduced by 10.4 cents.  The relative use of the funds seems clear; by far the largest fraction of money 
raised in the IPO is used to fund R&D and capital expenditures.  A much smaller fraction is used to 
increase inventories and reduce debt.  
Raising capital to fund future growth has been suggested in the literature as an important reason 
for going public.  We interpret the results in this section as supporting this hypothesis for most IPOs, 
since the majority of new capital (79%), is from the sale of primary shares.  As the proportion of primary 
shares increases, IPOs appear to be mainly aimed at raising capital to fund future growth.  The largest 
uses of the funding appear to be R&D and capital expenditures.  On the other hand, as the proportion of 
secondary shares increases, the motive for funding future investment diminishes.  We conjecture that in 
this case the major motive might be something else, such as eventually selling out the company or 
obtaining liquidity and diversification.  
C.  International Differences in Capital-Raising at IPOs 
Differences across Regions. 
  The results just presented suggest that firms around the world issue more primary shares when 
they have a demand for capital.  However, there are well-known differences across countries in terms of 
how their firms raise capital, their reliance on equity vs. debt markets, and even the types of shares 
offered in an IPO (see Table II).  It is plausible that the underlying reasons for IPOs could differ across 
regions given the wide variation observed in the institutional structure of financial markets. 
  To examine whether the underlying reasons for IPOs differ across regions, we break the sample 
into subsamples based on regions.  To ensure sufficient data, we focus on three broad regions.  We group 
North American companies (US and Canada) into one region, European companies into a second, and 




  For each region, we reestimate Specification (1) from Table IV.  We present the results for four 
of the dependent variables for each of the four time-periods for each region in Panels A-C of Table V.
14  
Panel A contains the results for the U.S. and Canada, Panel B for Europe, and Panel C for Asia. 
  The results for the U.S. and Canada closely mirror those for the entire sample.  In each case, the 
coefficients for primary capital are positive and statistically larger than both zero and the coefficient on 
secondary capital.  The coefficients on change in cash holdings decline with time period length, while the 
coefficients on R&D, capital expenditures, and debt reduction increase with the time period.  The 
magnitudes of the effects are similar to the entire sample as well.  The change in cash holdings per dollar 
raised declines from 72.2 cents to 46.5 cents, R&D increases from 15.4 cents to 87.2 cents, capital 
expenditures increase from 7.9 cents to 39.4 cents, and debt reduction increases from 4.5 cents to 10.2 
cents. 
  The estimates for Europe are similar to those reported for the entire sample except that there is no 
evidence that firms use their new capital to reduce debt in Europe.  The magnitude of the effect for R&D 
and capital expenditures again is increasing with the time horizon, although it seems to be of a smaller 
magnitude to the entire sample and to the North American subsample.
15  The effect for cash holdings is 
also similar except that, unlike for the entire sample and the North American subsample, it increases when 
a four-year horizon is used. 
  The estimates for Asia are based on substantially smaller samples than for North America and 
Europe due to data availability.  Thus, statistical significance is not as consistent and the patterns of 
coefficients’ sizes are less clear.  Nonetheless, it is evident that in Asia as well, firms that go public using 
primary offerings increase their expenditures on items reflected in the accounting variables we choose, 
while there is essentially no effect from capital raised through secondary offerings.  Interestingly, Asian 
                                                 
14 We have estimated these equations for each region using the other three dependent variables presented in Table 
IV, as well as for all seven dependent variables using Specification (2).  We omit these results to conserve on space.  
The results are similar to those reported.   
15 We test the cross equation restriction that coefficients for the primary capital are the same in both regions, 
allowing for differences in constant terms, and find that the effects are significantly larger in US and Canada for the 




firms show dramatic increases in capital expenditures and the effect on R&D is close to zero, which may 
reflect the characteristics of the industrialization process in the manufacturing sector of this region. Thus, 
it appears that in all regions, raising capital is an important reason why firms go public. 
Common vs. Civil Law. 
  Another possibility is that international differences in capital-raising are not due to geographic 
differences, but rather due to differences in legal systems.  In a well-known paper, La Porta et al. (1997) 
suggest that countries with a legal system based on common law protect their shareholders well and their 
companies are more likely to finance investments through equity.  In contrast, companies in countries 
with a legal system based on civil law are more likely to finance investment with debt, since shareholders 
are less well-protected and it is more difficult to raise equity.  This argument would suggest that when 
IPOs do occur in civil law countries, the motive is more often to provide liquidity for executives, while in 
common law countries, the motive would be more often to raise capital. 
  To examine this possibility, we reestimate our model pooling firms by the legal system in which 
they operate.  In Panel D of Table V, we present estimates of Equation (1) for common law firms, while 
in Panel E of Table V, we present corresponding estimates for Civil Law firms. 
  Comparing the two panels, it is evident that there are many more observations from Common 
Law countries than from Civil Law countries because of the large number of IPOs in the U.S., and for the 
availability of data for more firms in the U.S. and in the U.K.  Yet, it appears from Panel E that when 
Civil Law firms go public, they do so to raise capital as well.  The coefficients on change in cash, R&D, 
and capital expenditures are all positive, although of a smaller magnitude than for common law countries. 
But still, they have the same temporal pattern; the change in cash for each dollar raised decreases with the 
time horizon while the change in R&D and capital expenditures per dollar raised increases with the time 
horizon.  The one difference between the equations in the two panels is that there is evidence that 
common law firms reduce debt with the cash they raise but civil law firms do not. 
We test the cross-equation restriction that the coefficient on fresh capital is the same for common 




we can reject the hypothesis that they are equal at the 5% level for slightly less than half of the equations, 
especially for R&D and cash holdings.
16 
  It is commonly argued that a major difference between common law and civil law firms is that 
common law firms are more reliant on equity markets for financing than are civil law firms.  Perhaps this 
claim is true for firms that are already public.  The fact that more firms do go public in common law 
countries than in civil law countries is consistent with this view.  However, our findings suggest that 
when civil law firms do go public, they do so to raise capital in a similar manner to common law firms. 
 
IV. IPO Offer Type and Subsequent Equity Offerings 
We have argued that in a cross-section of IPOs, firms’ reasons for going public should be 
reflected in the identity of shares they sell to the public.  Consistent with this argument are previous 
results showing that firms issuing primary shares have larger increase in a number of variables such as 
capital expenditures and research and development.  An additional prediction of this argument is that 
firms choosing to issue primary shares, which presumably have higher demand for capital than firms 
issuing secondary shares, will raise more capital in other ways than firms issuing secondary shares.  We 
do not have data on bank loans for our sample and firms issuing an IPO typically do not have access to 
the public debt markets immediately after going public.  Therefore, we focus our analysis on the question 
of whether firms that have IPOs reenter the public equity market and raise capital through a seasoned 
equity offer following the IPO. 
A.  Univariate Tests 
Table VI presents the total proceeds and fresh capital raised through SEOs during the two years 
following an IPO for each of the three IPO offer types, as well as for the entire sample.  The total 
proceeds and fresh capital from original IPOs are also provided for comparison.  The last seven columns 
show the number of SEOs by SEO offer type and also by IPO offer type.   
                                                 




Conditional on there being an SEO within two years of an IPO, the proportion of fresh capital out 
of total proceeds raised at SEOs is the lowest when the original IPO offering is secondary.  Only 6% of 
the total proceeds from SEOs are fresh capital if the original IPO offer is secondary only.  Out of 56 SEOs 
that followed the secondary-only IPOs, 64% of them again offered only secondary shares, strongly 
suggesting that the original IPO was indeed motivated by intentions to eventually sell out.   In contrast, 
for primary-only IPOs, fresh capital raised at the SEO stage accounts for 56% of the total proceeds.  Out 
of 2,386 SEOs that followed the primary-only IPO, 65% of them again offered primary shares only, 
implying that original IPO was motivated by demand for capital rather than to obtain liquidity.   
Overall, there is a clear pattern to these data.  Firms in general are more likely to issue secondary 
shares at an SEO than at an IPO.  However, firms that issue primary shares at the IPO are much more 
likely to issue them again at the SEO.  This finding is consistent with the argument that firms that issue 
primary shares have a higher demand for capital than those issuing secondary shares, suggesting that 
these firms go public at least in part to facilitate capital raising. 
B.  Multivariate Tests 
We next consider the relation between IPO offer type and subsequent equity offerings in a 
multivariate context.  To do so, we consider specifications similar to those estimated in Table IV, except 
that the dependent variable reflects subsequent capital raising.  We report results using both 
Specifications (1) and (2), and for the entire sample and also for the subsample of combined offerings.  As 
in the equations reported in Table IV, all equations include fixed effects capturing year effects, country 
effects and industry effects. 
In Panel A-1 of Table VII, we estimate the probability of raising new capital through an SEO in 
the two years following the IPO.  Our dependent variable equals one if the firm raises new capital through 
an SEO in the two years following the IPO, and zero otherwise.  Because this dependent variable is 
dichotomous, we estimate this equation by logit.  Second, in Panel A-2 of Table VII, we estimate the 
quantity of new capital raised in the two years following the IPO normalized by the total asset.  This 




variable is the number of SEOs that raised new capital within 2 years of an IPO.  This variable is also 
censored, so we also estimate this equation by Tobit.  
In Panel B of Table VII, we test the hypothesis that as more secondary shares are offered at IPOs, 
the subsequent SEOs will also tend to sell more secondary shares.  Specifically, we replace the dependent 
variables in Panels A-1, A-2 and A-3 with the probability of an at least partially secondary SEO (B-1), the 
secondary value raised in an SEO (B-2), and the number of at least partially secondary SEOs (B-3). Here, 
we expect the opposite pattern from that of Panel A; in particular, negative or insignificant coefficients 
for the value of the new capital raised at the IPO, but significantly positive coefficient for value of 
secondary shares sold at the IPO.  Similarly, we also expect the coefficient for the relative proportion of 
primary shares to be significantly negative. 
Our estimates in Panel A-1 indicate that the probability of raising new equity capital subsequent 
to an IPO is significantly positively correlated with the new capital raised at IPO for combined offerings, 
although the coefficient is insignificant when we use all 3 types of IPOs in the regression.  In 
specification (2) however, the coefficients for relative proportion of primary shares are significantly 
positive when all 3 IPO types are used as well as when only the combined IPOs are used.   
The tobit estimates in Panel A-2 exhibit similar and clearer results.  Here, we find that the 
magnitude of the new capital raised subsequent to an IPO is significantly positively related to the quantity 
of fresh capital raised at the IPO, as well as to the proportion of primary offerings at IPO.  Panel A-3, 
where the dependent variable is the number of SEOs that raised new capital, contains similar results. 
Panels B-1, B-2, and B-3 present estimates of similar equations to those in Panels A-1, A-2 and 
A-3, except that the dependent variables are the number and proceeds of secondary shares from SEOs 
rather than the number and proceeds of new capital raising SEOs.  The estimates in these panels indicate 
that the number of secondary offerings at the SEO stage and the quantity of secondary capital raised in 
these offerings is generally positively related to the sale of secondary shares in the original IPO.   
Overall, the multivariate analysis suggests that as the relative proportion of new capital raised in 




raising new capital through an SEO all increase.  In contrast, when the original IPO involves secondary 
shares, follow up offerings also are more likely to involve offerings of secondary shares.  These results 
are also consistent with earlier arguments that demand for capital is an important determinant of the type 
of shares offered in an IPO.  When the IPO offers primary shares, as in the majority of IPOs, there 
appears to be a relatively high demand for capital.  This finding is consistent with capital raising being an 
important determinant of the going-public decision for these firms. 
 
V. Conclusion  
  Initial public offerings are one of the most visible and most studied events in finance.  Yet, the 
basic question of why firms go public has received astonishingly little attention from the empirical 
literature.  We provide some evidence on this question, using a sample of 16,958 IPOs from 38 countries.  
Our approach is to recognize that IPOs differ in the type of shares they offer to the public.  Some IPOs 
sell exclusively new, ‘primary’ shares, others sell exclusively ‘secondary’ shares held by insiders, while a 
third type sells a combination of the two.  By comparing the types of IPOs, we are able to provide insight 
into how the motives for going public vary across types. 
We first document some basic facts about the relative proportion of primary and secondary shares 
offered at the IPO.  While firms in most countries issue a majority of primary shares, the proportion varies 
noticeably across countries, being lowest in European countries and the highest in Asian countries other 
than Japan.    
Next, we test whether the choice of type of shares to issue can explain the differences in 
normalized increases across firms in a number of accounting variables that are likely to proxy for future 
growth and investment.  Using both univariate and multivariate tests, we find that the amount of primary 
offerings are significantly correlated with increases in inventory, net property, plant and equipment (PPE), 
capital expenditures and R & D expenditures up to 4 years after the IPO, whereas the amount of 
secondary offerings have little or no explanatory power.  The largest expenditures are on R&D and capital 




reductions in debt levels and increases in cash, which presumably ease potential financial constraints 
facing the firms.   
Companies appear to save much of the cash raised and pay it out over a several year period.  For 
each dollar raised, about 69 cents is kept as cash in the first year, declining to 50 cents in year four.  
Expenditures rise over time; R&D expenditures increase by 17 cents per dollar raised in the first year, 
increasing to 88 cents in year four.  This relation between capital acquired in the IPO and subsequent 
expenditures holds in different regions of the world, and in countries with both common and civil law. 
Finally, we examine the effect of IPO offer type on subsequent equity capital-raising activities.  
Again using both univariate and multivariate tests, we find that the probability and the magnitude of 
subsequently raised fresh capital through an SEO within two years of an IPO are positively correlated 
with the proportion of primary offerings. 
  Our conclusion is that firms offering primary shares appear to be associated with a higher demand 
for capital than firms offering secondary shares to the public.  Since most IPOs offer at least some 
primary shares and primary shares represent 79% of the value of the shares sold to the public, this 
suggests that capital-raising is an important motive for going public.  We emphasize that this conclusion 
is counter to the received wisdom of the profession, which argues that raising capital is not an important 
reason for going public (see Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998)). 
  The ability of equity markets to provide financing for firms outside the U.S. and the U.K. has 
been widely questioned (see La Porta et al. (1997)).  Yet, we find that primary offerings are the 
predominate form of IPO in most of the world, and primary offerings appear to be correlated with a 
number of factors measuring the demand for capital.  These findings are at least suggestive of the idea 
that firms around the world do in fact use equity markets to raise capital for investment.  The extent to 
which they do so, and the factors that determine across countries the differences in equity markets are 
important issues not analyzed here, and of course would be good topics for future research. 
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Sample Descriptive Statistics 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the sample. Panel A presents number of IPOs and Panel B 
shows the total proceeds raised through IPOs across different regions in the sample.  The last row in each 
panel shows the percentages.  The sample period is from 1990 to 2003. 
  
Panel A: Number of IPOs 
Year 
Asia 




Europe  UK Latin  Am US  Canada Total 
1990 67  3  4  13     152  3  242 
1991  317  55  4  28 2 6  299 2  713 
1992  534  17 26  26 15 9  410 4  1,041 
1993 717  83  58  45 17  17 523 169  1,629 
1994 1,172  135  92  77 90  33  445  161 2,205 
1995 1,090  166  27  91 47  6  461  126 2,014 
1996 899  139  51  128 143  15 668 198  2,241 
1997 223  131  57  200 121  11 449 202  1,394 
1998  84  76  26  242 60  3 247 131 869 
1999 135  95  84  369 32  3 395  88  1,201 
2000 322  189  126  396 168  6 313 102  1,622 
2001 209  142  45  110 70  3  70  30 679 
2002  221  109 55  53 51 1  64 1  555 
2003  254  106 73  23 42 3  51 1  553 
            
Total 6,244  1,446  728  1,801 858  116 4,547 1,218  16,958 
% 36.8 8.5  4.3  10.6 5.1 0.7  26.8 7.2  100.0 
      
Panel B: Total Amount of Proceeds (US$ mil) raised at IPOs 
Year 
Asia 




Europe UK  Latin  Am US  Canada  Total 
1990 1,193  832  23  448     4,245  70  6,811 
1991 3,001  3,657  196  1,522 201  587  10,506  43  19,711 
1992 3,821  396  1,533  774 1,278  509  16,471  71  24,853 
1993  4,524 3,606  909  3,366 567 1,663  19,600 2,916  37,151 
1994  9,436 6,298  2,433  4,252 4,323 2,100  15,005 2,114  45,961 
1995  7,822  7,385 1,206  10,786 2,318 717  21,844 886  52,964 
1996 6,262  5,435  1,165  9,903 5,467  944  32,688  1,691  63,555 
1997  7,845 2,174  1,094  10,955 5,566 1,157  23,693 2,717  55,201 
1998 1,645  2,148  209 15,093 5,328  44  19,341  1,278  45,086 
1999  7,129  5,152 1,226  25,893 3,853 383  42,751 438  86,824 
2000 5,123  10,854  1,336 34,847 6,534  692  32,866  1,283  93,534 
2001 5,920  4,180  453  5,578 1,769  1,813  22,265  531  42,509 
2002 4,794  2,204  506  3,084 3,539  122  11,813  1  26,063 
2003 4,418  4,221  2,221  254 2,856  81  6,734  1  20,785 
            
Total 72,932  58,543  14,509 126,754 43,598  10,812  279,822  14,038  621,009 





Distribution of IPO Offer Types 
This table presents the distribution of IPO offer types across the countries in our sample.  An IPO is 
characterized as primary only, secondary only or combined offering, according to the type(s) of shares 
being sold. Panel A presents the number of IPOs and Panel B shows the total proceeds.  The percentages 
are reported in parentheses. The sample period is from 1990 to 2003. 
 
Panel A: Number of IPOs 
Region  Nation  Primary only  Secondary only  Combined  Total issues 
    Number % number % number %  number 
Asia Hong  Kong  432  (81.1)  2  (0.4) 99  (18.6)  533 
  India  3,582  (97.7)  53 (1.4)  30 (0.8)  3,665 
  Indonesia  148  (98.7)  1 (0.7)  1 (0.7)  150 
  Malaysia  388  (93.3)  7 (1.7)  21 (5.0)  416 
  Pakistan  177  (99.4)  1  (0.6)    178 
 Philippines  57  (95.0)      3  (5.0)  60 
  Singapore  275  (89.9)  3 (1.0)  28 (9.2)  306 
 South  Korea  280  (99.6)      1  (0.4)  281 
  Taiwan  454  (99.3)  2 (0.4)  1 (0.2)  457 
 Thailand 197  (99.5)      1  (0.5)  198 
 Japan  196  (13.6)  9  (0.6)  1,241  (85.8)  1,446 
Pacific Australia  602  (87.6)  20 (2.9)  65 (9.5)  687 
  New  Zealand  35  (85.4)  2 (4.9)  4 (9.8)  41 
Europe Austria  28  (71.8)  2 (5.1)  9  (23.1)  39 
 Belgium  29  (64.4)  1  (2.2)  15  (33.3)  45 
 Denmark  31  (64.6)  2  (4.2)  15  (31.3)  48 
 Finland  29  (60.4)  4  (8.3)  15  (31.3)  48 
 France  387  (78.7)  37  (7.5)  68  (13.8)  492 
 Germany 256  (65.0)  7  (1.8)  131  (33.2)  394 
 Greece  126  (96.9)      4  (3.1)  130 
 Ireland  18  (72.0)      7  (28.0)  25 
 Israel  77  (77.8)      22  (22.2)  99 
 Italy  68  (54.8)  10  (8.1)  46  (37.1)  124 
 Netherlands  36  (46.2)  6  (7.7)  36  (46.2)  78 
 Norway  73  (92.4)      6  (7.6)  79 
  Portugal  7  (70.0)  3  (30.0)   10 
  Spain  21  (60.0)  8 (22.9)  6 (17.1)  35 
  Sweden  53  (58.2)  11 (12.1)  27 (29.7)  91 
  Switzerland  26  (50.0)  8 (15.4)  18 (34.6)  52 
 UK  751  (87.5)  9  (1.0)  98  (11.4)  858 
  Turkey  11  (91.7)  1  (8.3)   12 
Latin  Am  Argentina  6  (46.2)  4 (30.8)  3 (23.1)  13 
 Bermuda  14  (73.7)      5  (26.3)  19 
  Brazil  10  (66.7)  2 (13.3)  3 (20.0)  15 
  Chile  14  (87.5)  1 (6.3)  1 (6.3)  16 
 Mexico  29  (54.7)  4  (7.5)  20  (37.7)  53 
North Am  Canada  897  (73.6)  9  (0.7)  312  (25.6)  1,218 
 US  3,096  (68.1)  53  (1.2)  1,398  (30.7)  4,547 
                




Table II  Continued 
Panel B: Total Amount of Proceeds (US$ mil) 
Region  Nation  Primary  Secondary  Combined (primary & secondary) offerings  Total  Total  Total 
    only offerings  only offerings primary  secondary  combined total  Primary  Secondary  issues 
   amount %  amount % amount %  amount %  amount % amount %  amount %  amount
Asia Hong  Kong  11,121 (85.7) 63 (0.5) 1,240 (9.6) 551 (4.2) 1,791 (13.8) 12,361 (95.3) 614 (4.7) 12,976
 India  6,479 (94.0) 93 (1.3) 147 (2.1) 171 (2.5) 318 (4.6) 6,626 (96.2) 264 (3.8) 6,889
 Indonesia  5,418 (90.6) 155 (2.6) 343 (5.7) 66 (1.1) 410 (6.8) 5,762 (96.3) 222 (3.7) 5,983
 Malaysia  3,294 (74.7) 631 (14.3) 241 (5.5) 244 (5.5) 485 (11.0) 3,534 (80.2) 875 (19.8) 4,409
 Pakistan  628 (88.2) 84 (11.8) 628 (88.2) 84 (11.8) 711
 Philippines  1,723 (94.5) 66 (3.6) 35 (1.9) 101 (5.5) 1,790 (98.1) 35 (1.9) 1,824
 Singapore  4,756 (87.7) 303 (5.6) 271 (5.0) 94 (1.7) 365 (6.7) 5,027 (92.7) 397 (7.3) 5,424
 South  Korea  18,550 (99.8) 10 (0.1) 24 (0.1) 35 (0.2) 18,560 (99.9) 24 (0.1) 18,585
 Taiwan  11,421 (99.5) 53 (0.5) 4 (0.0) 1 (0.0) 5 (0.0) 11,425 (99.5) 54 (0.5) 11,479
 Thailand  4,648 (99.9) 4 (0.1) 1 (0.0) 4 (0.1) 4,651 (100.0) 1 (0.0) 4,652
 Japan  6,937 (11.9) 246 (0.4) 31,253 (53.4) 20,106 (34.3) 51,359 (87.7) 38,191 (65.2) 20,352 (34.8) 58,543
Pacific Australia  9,846 (73.8) 1,477 (11.1) 647 (4.9) 1,370 (10.3) 2,018 (15.1) 10,493 (78.7) 2,848 (21.3) 13,341
 New  Zealand  811 (69.4) 128 (11.0) 39 (3.3) 190 (16.3) 229 (19.6) 850 (72.7) 319 (27.3) 1,168
Europe Austria  1,140 (57.5) 417 (21.0) 229 (11.6) 197 (9.9) 426 (21.5) 1,370 (69.1) 614 (30.9) 1,984
 Belgium  3,345 (58.8) 1,610 (28.3) 445 (7.8) 289 (5.1) 734 (12.9) 3,790 (66.6) 1,899 (33.4) 5,689
 Denmark  1,323 (49.9) 88 (3.3) 457 (17.2) 786 (29.6) 1,243 (46.8) 1,780 (67.1) 874 (32.9) 2,654
 Finland  960 (41.7) 366 (15.9) 491 (21.3) 484 (21.0) 976 (42.4) 1,452 (63.1) 850 (36.9) 2,302
 France  7,890 (46.3) 3,069 (18.0) 1,478 (8.7) 4,588 (26.9) 6,066 (35.6) 9,368 (55.0) 7,656 (45.0) 17,025
 Germany  16,851 (51.8) 917 (2.8) 5,736 (17.6) 9,029 (27.8) 14,765 (45.4) 22,587 (69.4) 9,946 (30.6) 32,533
 Greece 3,057 (97.3) 57 (1.8) 29 (0.9) 86 (2.7) 3,114 (99.1) 29 (0.9) 3,143
 Ireland  456 (45.9) 362 (36.5) 175 (17.6) 537 (54.1) 818 (82.4) 175 (17.6) 993
 Israel  1,912 (66.0) 704 (24.3) 282 (9.7) 986 (34.0) 2,615 (90.3) 282 (9.7) 2,898
 Italy  4,173 (43.7) 1,621 (17.0) 2,076 (21.7) 1,685 (17.6) 3,761 (39.4) 6,248 (65.4) 3,307 (34.6) 9,555
 Netherlands  5,484 (39.3) 2,197 (15.7) 3,790 (27.1) 2,500 (17.9) 6,290 (45.0) 9,274 (66.4) 4,697 (33.6) 13,971
 Norway  1,794 (71.0) 554 (21.9) 180 (7.1) 734 (29.0) 2,348 (92.9) 180 (7.1) 2,528
 Portugal  583 (72.5) 221 (27.5) 583 (72.5) 221 (27.5) 805
 Spain  3,208 (41.3) 2,984 (38.4) 609 (7.8) 964 (12.4) 1,573 (20.3) 3,817 (49.1) 3,949 (50.9) 7,765
 Sweden 7,378 (74.2) 710 (7.1) 893 (9.0) 962 (9.7) 1,854 (18.7) 8,271 (83.2) 1,672 (16.8) 9,943
 Switzerland  8,240 (65.5) 1,960 (15.6) 914 (7.3) 1,469 (11.7) 2,382 (18.9) 9,154 (72.8) 3,429 (27.2) 12,583
 UK  24,697 (56.6) 2,637 (6.0) 8,705 (20.0) 7,558 (17.3) 16,264 (37.3) 33,403 (76.6) 10,196 (23.4) 43,598
 Turkey  359 (93.0) 27 (7.0) 359 (93.0) 27 (7.0) 385
Latin Am  Argentina  346 (44.1) 84 (10.7) 251 (32.0) 103 (13.1) 354 (45.2) 597 (76.2) 187 (23.8) 783
 Bermuda  2,518 (82.2) 230 (7.5) 314 (10.3) 544 (17.8) 2,748 (89.7) 314 (10.3) 3,062
 Brazil  538 (38.1) 212 (15.0) 312 (22.1) 349 (24.7) 661 (46.8) 850 (60.2) 562 (39.8) 1,412
 Chile  1,365 (90.6) 6 (0.4) 117 (7.8) 19 (1.2) 135 (9.0) 1,482 (98.4) 24 (1.6) 1,506
 Mexico 2,942 (72.7) 124 (3.1) 505 (12.5) 477 (11.8) 982 (24.3) 3,447 (85.1) 602 (14.9) 4,049
North Am  Canada  10,348 (73.7) 2 (0.0) 2,982 (21.2) 706 (5.0) 3,688 (26.3) 13,330 (95.0) 708 (5.0) 14,038
 US  174,576 (62.4) 20,039 (7.2) 55,891 (20.0) 29,315 (10.5) 85,207 (30.5) 230,468 (82.4) 49,354 (17.6) 279,822
                 





Average Normalized Increases in Assets and Expenditures Following IPOs, by Offer Type  
This table presents the mean and median increases in assets and expenditures following an IPO.  Increase 
in assets (total assets, inventory, net PPE, cash) is defined as 
() ] 1 ) a   ln[( 0 0 + − ssets total V Vt , and increase in expenditures (CAPEX, R&D, reduction in long term 
debt) is defined as   ] 1 )   ln[( 0 1 + ∑ = assets total V
t
i i , where 0 denotes the fiscal year end just prior to the 
IPO and t denotes number of years after year 0.  t-statistics for comparisons of means between primary 
only and combined, and between combined and secondary only group are also provided.  Bold letters 
indicate statistical significance at less than 5%.  The sample period for this table is from 1990 to 2001. 
   N  Mean      Median 
    Total  IPO offer type  IPO offer type  t-stat  IPO offer type 























                       
∆Total 1  5,475  3,441  105  1,929  0.94 0.16 0.69 11.37 8.55 0.73 0.11 0.53
Assets 2  4,678  2,910  90  1,678  1.13 0.35 0.93 7.14 7.17 0.93 0.29 0.79
 3  3,664  2,242  74  1,348  1.21 0.58 1.09 3.66 4.96 1.04 0.49 0.95
 4  2,845  1,728  58  1,059  1.27 0.68 1.19 2.16 4.15 1.11 0.60 1.07
                    
∆Inventory 1  5,329  3,340 100 1,889  0.07 0.03 0.06 3.28 2.12 0.01 0.01 0.01
   2  4,529  2,813  86  1,630  0.15 0.06 0.13 3.43 2.78 0.04 0.01 0.03
 3  3,551  2,176  72  1,303  0.22 0.08 0.17 3.79 2.70 0.07 0.03 0.05
 4  2,750  1,678  52  1,020  0.27 0.12 0.22 3.13 2.09 0.10 0.03 0.07
                    
∆Net PPE  1  5,453  3,426  104  1,923  0.17 0.05 0.12 7.09 3.40 0.07 0.02 0.05
 2  4,658  2,897  89  1,672  0.34 0.12 0.26 5.87 3.80 0.18 0.05 0.15
 3  3,644  2,228  74  1,342  0.44 0.20 0.37 3.65 3.19 0.25 0.14 0.23
 4  2,826  1,715  58  1,053  0.51 0.27 0.44 2.88 2.58 0.30 0.18 0.29
                    
∑CAPEX 1  5,021  3,286 96  1,639  0.19 0.09 0.16 3.92 3.47 0.11 0.06 0.10
 2  4,227  2,751  83  1,393  0.40 0.17 0.37 2.60 4.94 0.26 0.13 0.26
 3  3,266  2,098  68  1,100  0.56 0.29 0.54 0.88 4.60 0.39 0.22 0.42
 4  2,512  1,605  53  854  0.69 0.40 0.69 -0.12 4.09 0.51 0.31 0.56
                    
∑R&D 1  2,789  1,822  38  929  0.31 0.04 0.19 9.25 3.11 0.19 0.02 0.14
 2  2,373  1,525  35  813  0.63 0.10 0.40 9.20 3.66 0.48 0.05 0.31
 3  1,868  1,154  33  681  0.82 0.16 0.60 6.34 3.03 0.65 0.09 0.47
 4  1,453  862  27  564  0.96 0.23 0.78 3.93 2.44 0.80 0.12 0.67
                    
∆Cash 1  5,458  3,430  104  1,924  0.64 0.04 0.45 9.77 7.43 0.34 0.01 0.21
 2  4,664  2,902  89  1,673  0.56 0.06 0.44 5.70 5.78 0.22 0.01 0.17
 3  3,651  2,234  74  1,343  0.50 0.12 0.45 1.98 4.25 0.14 0.02 0.15
 4  2,834  1,722  58  1,054  0.48 0.13 0.46 0.71 3.68 0.13 0.02 0.15
                    
∑LT Debt  1  4,215  2,801  65  1,349  0.20 0.11 0.21 -0.57 2.81 0.07 0.03 0.09
Reduction 2 3,526 2,311  54  1,161  0.31 0.18 0.29 1.42 2.17 0.16 0.08 0.16
 3  2,779  1,777  45  957  0.45 0.27 0.40 2.40 1.73 0.25 0.13 0.24





The Effect of IPO Offer Type on Subsequent Increases in Assets and Expenditures  
The dependent variable for asset-based variables (total assets, inventory, net PPE, cash) is Y = 
() ] 1 )   ln[( 0 0 + − assets total V Vt , and for expenditures (CAPEX, R&D, reduction in long term debt) is Y = 
] 1 ) 0   1 ln[( + ∑ = assets total t
i i V .  In panel A, the independent variables are primary capital, secondary 
capital, both of which are normalized by total assets, and log[total assets] . In panel B, they are proportion 
of primary shares out of total shares, total proceeds over total assets, and log[total assets].   All 
regressions include year, country, and industry (2 digit SIC) fixed effects (not reported).  p-values are 
from testing β1 = β2. Dollar changes are the implied change in the variable considered (∆Total Assets, 
etc.) when new capital is increased by $1 (for a median-sized firm in 1996 in the U.S. with 2 digit SIC 73: 
business services) Bold letters indicate statistical significance at 5%, using heteroscedasticity-consistent 
standard errors. The sample period for this table is from 1990 to 2001.  
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asset    total
capital secondary 
ln
0 ln[asset] p-value    
V t  N  β1  t-stat  β2  t-stat  β3  t-stat  β1= β2 $change R
2 
∆Total Asset  1  5,475  0.951 63.20 0.180 8.66 0.00 0.42 0.000 0.951 0.90 
  2  4,678  0.857 34.08 0.265 7.53 -0.01 -1.73 0.000 1.107 0.81 
  3  3,664  0.737 18.34 0.369 6.93 -0.02 -2.07 0.000 1.131 0.74 
  4  2,845  0.709 13.88 0.376 5.18 -0.03 -2.16 0.000 1.234 0.72 
                    
∆Inventory  1  5,329  0.046 6.59 0.001 0.13 -0.01 -5.57 0.000 0.023 0.30 
  2  4,529  0.076 6.13 -0.003 -0.20 -0.02 -7.95 0.000 0.038 0.39 
  3  3,551  0.092 5.22 0.006 0.27 -0.03 -7.26 0.004 0.049 0.41 
  4  2,750  0.098 4.13 0.023 0.71 -0.04 -6.72 0.075 0.053 0.44 
                   
∆Net PPE  1  5,453  0.166 14.38 0.000 0.02 0.00 1.16 0.000 0.093 0.42 
  2  4,658  0.300 16.14 0.050 2.42 0.00 0.21 0.000 0.187 0.53 
  3  3,644  0.300 11.59 0.083 2.58 0.00 -0.37 0.000 0.210 0.54 
  4  2,826  0.332 8.78 0.081 1.73 0.00 -0.05 0.000 0.248 0.53 
                    
∑CAPEX  1  5,021  0.145 14.81 0.017 1.60 0.00 0.46 0.000 0.083 0.54 
  2  4,227  0.304 18.37 0.073 3.84 0.00 0.67 0.000 0.202 0.65 
  3  3,266  0.374 15.44 0.097 3.30 0.00 0.60 0.000 0.302 0.69 
  4  2,512  0.417 11.47 0.138 3.32 0.00 -0.08 0.000 0.387 0.71 
                   
∑R&D  1  2,789  0.281 21.21 0.004 0.25 0.01 1.45 0.000 0.171 0.74 
  2  2,373  0.519 22.80 0.022 0.83 0.01 1.51 0.000 0.399 0.82 
  3  1,868  0.642 18.76 0.067 1.71 0.01 1.14 0.000 0.636 0.83 
  4  1,453  0.699 14.58 0.109 1.98 0.00 0.06 0.000 0.882 0.84 
                    
∆Cash  1  5,458  0.880 54.13 0.177 8.13 0.02 5.40 0.000 0.688 0.85 
  2  4,664  0.744 32.50 0.213 6.59 0.04 6.07 0.000 0.578 0.69 
  3  3,651  0.661 19.38 0.293 6.88 0.03 4.34 0.000 0.522 0.58 
  4  2,834  0.604 13.48 0.279 5.34 0.02 1.77 0.000 0.500 0.53 
                    
∑LT Debt  1  4,215  0.067 4.80 -0.019 -0.99 0.02 5.56 0.000 0.042 0.40 
   Reduction  2  3,526  0.082 4.14 -0.055 -1.93 0.02 3.84 0.000 0.056 0.45 
  3  2,779  0.082 3.02 -0.136 -3.08 0.02 2.34 0.000 0.068 0.48 




Table IV  Continued 
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proceeds   total
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V t   N   γ1  t-stat   γ2  t-stat   γ3 t-stat    R
2 
∆Total 
Asset  1   5,475   0.401 12.55   0.400  34.34   -0.030 -5.01   0.85 
  2   4,678   0.336 8.02   0.406  27.37   -0.022 -2.55   0.79 
  3   3,664   0.236 4.32   0.379  18.82  -0.014  -1.17    0.74 
  4   2,845   0.187 2.73   0.372  14.98  -0.017  -1.04    0.71 
                           
∆Inventory  1   5,329   0.023 3.26    0.022 7.23    -0.010 -5.63   0.29 
  2   4,529   0.048 3.79    0.038 7.34    -0.024 -6.93   0.39 
  3   3,551   0.058 3.03    0.046 6.16    -0.032 -6.08   0.41 
  4   2,750   0.047 1.74   0.051 5.20    -0.041 -5.67   0.44 
                         
∆Net PPE  1   5,453   0.093 7.24    0.068 13.22   -0.002  -0.61    0.40 
  2   4,658   0.131 5.92    0.135 15.31   -0.005  -1.00    0.52 
  3   3,644   0.128 4.25    0.146 12.12   -0.003  -0.38    0.53 
  4   2,826   0.122 2.94    0.164 9.74   0.001  0.11   0.53 
                         
∑CAPEX  1   5,021   0.064 5.13    0.065 13.43   -0.002  -0.86    0.52 
  2   4,227   0.118 5.56    0.149 16.17   0.000  0.03   0.63 
  3   3,266   0.156 5.13    0.187 14.12   0.004  0.54   0.68 
  4   2,512   0.133 3.20   0.216  11.73  0.003  0.27   0.70 
                         
∑R&D  1   2,789   0.115 5.63    0.129 16.75   -0.006  -1.25    0.70 
  2   2,373   0.260 6.57    0.254 16.55   -0.003  -0.30    0.79 
  3   1,868   0.313 5.48    0.329 14.70   0.003  0.24   0.81 
  4   1,453   0.303 4.06    0.366 12.26   -0.008  -0.45    0.82 
                           
∆Cash  1   5,458   0.308 10.83    0.351 32.97    -0.017 -3.05   0.77 
  2   4,664   0.247 7.39    0.316 25.45   0.011  1.52   0.64 
  3   3,651   0.178 4.59    0.288 18.28   0.015  1.65   0.54 
  4   2,834   0.157 3.27    0.260 13.69   0.002  0.14   0.49 
                         
∑LT Debt  1   4,215   0.101 5.10    0.038 5.45    0.025 5.79   0.40 
   Reduction  2   3,526   0.149 5.02    0.037 3.36    0.023 3.40   0.45 
  3   2,779   0.235 5.20   0.027  1.78    0.019 1.83    0.48 
  4   2,194   0.306 4.91   0.029  1.39    0.013 0.88    0.50 






The Effect of IPO Offer Type on Subsequent increases in Assets and Expenditures:   
Regional Analysis 
 
The independent variables are primary capital and secondary capital normalized by total assets.  The 
dependent variable for asset-based variables (total assets, inventory, net PPE, cash) is Y = 
() ] 1 )   ln[( 0 0 + − assets total V Vt , and for expenditures (CAPEX, R&D, reduction in long term debt) is Y = 
] 1 ) 0   1 ln[( + ∑ = assets total t
i i V .  Panel A shows results for US & Canada, and Panels B and C represent 
Europe and Asia respectively.  The results by legal origin are presented in Panels D(common) and E 
(civil). All regressions include year, country, and industry (2 digit SIC) fixed effects (not reported).  p-
values are from testing β1 = β2. Dollar changes are the implied change in the variable considered (∆Total 
Assets, etc.) when new capital is increased by $1 (for a median-sized firm in 1996 with 2 digit SIC 73: 
business services.  The reference countries are US for US and Canada, France for Europe, and Japan for 
Asia) Bold letters indicate statistical significance at 5%, using heteroscedasticity-consistent standard 
errors. The sample period for this table is from 1990 to 2001.  
 
 Panel A: US and Canada 
 



















asset    total
capital secondary 
ln
0 ln[asset] p-value    
V t  N  β1  t-stat  β2  t-stat  β3  t-stat  β1= β2 $change R
2 
                  
∑CAPEX  1  3,406  0.166 13.63 0.012 0.84 0.01 2.27 0.000 0.079 0.58 
  2  3,038  0.353 16.78 0.056 2.27 0.02 3.03 0.000 0.201 0.68 
  3  2,468  0.436 14.54 0.080 2.29 0.03 2.80 0.000 0.309 0.70 
  4  1,955  0.472 10.73 0.116 2.49 0.03 1.72 0.000 0.394 0.71 
                 
∑R&D  1  2,307  0.294 20.30 0.002 0.13 0.01 1.84 0.000 0.154 0.75 
  2  2,052  0.539 23.10 0.020 0.67 0.02 2.40 0.000 0.372 0.82 
  3  1,631  0.680 20.08 0.065 1.56 0.03 2.61 0.000 0.618 0.84 
  4  1,264  0.740 16.00 0.105 1.82 0.02 1.21 0.000 0.872 0.84 
                 
∆Cash  1  3,439  0.945 47.95 0.148 5.18 0.04 6.91 0.000 0.722 0.88 
  2  3,087  0.812 27.67 0.256 5.95 0.07 7.38 0.000 0.593 0.72 
  3  2,524  0.720 16.74 0.308 5.79 0.06 5.19 0.000 0.519 0.59 
  4  2,012  0.628 11.47 0.325 5.09 0.04 2.76 0.001 0.465 0.54 
                 
∑LT Debt  1  3,394  0.087 4.93 -0.055 -2.29 0.03 5.14 0.000 0.045 0.42 
   Reduction  2  3,004  0.109 4.66 -0.103 -3.04 0.03 4.37 0.000 0.062 0.46 
  3  2,422  0.105 3.47 -0.162 -3.40 0.03 2.74 0.000 0.072 0.48 
  4  1,901  0.132 3.01 -0.228 -3.52 0.03 1.64 0.000 0.102 0.51 




Table V  Continued 
 
Panel B: Europe          



















asset    total
capital secondary 
ln
0 ln[asset] p-value    
V t  N  β1  t-stat  β2  t-stat  β3  t-stat  β1= β2 $change R
2 
                 
∑CAPEX  1    1,151   0.092 4.68 0.029 1.56 -0.01 -1.61 0.025 0.056 0.46 
  2      900   0.160 5.91 0.085 2.92 -0.02 -2.87 0.064 0.114 0.61 
  3      611   0.195 4.13 0.130 2.17 -0.04 -3.61 0.346 0.170 0.69 
  4      401   0.324 4.03 0.199 2.09 -0.06 -3.12 0.290 0.308 0.77 
                
∑R&D  1      270   0.210 6.03 0.049 1.41 0.00 -0.46 0.001 0.133 0.71 
  2      177   0.413 6.53 0.139 1.87 -0.02 -1.13 0.009 0.384 0.86 
  3      125   0.467 3.82 0.024 0.20 -0.09 -3.00 0.011 0.632 0.87 
  4        94   0.489 2.43 0.177 0.74 -0.16 -2.48 0.310 0.876 0.89 
                
∆Cash  1    1,243   0.708 21.43 0.247 6.84 -0.01 -1.12 0.000 0.541 0.81 
  2      987   0.543 11.44 0.169 3.37 -0.02 -1.49 0.000 0.419 0.65 
  3      682   0.498 6.75 0.278 3.22 -0.01 -0.49 0.017 0.425 0.59 
  4      450   0.601 5.66 0.081 0.94 -0.03 -1.77 0.000 0.623 0.59 
                
∑LT Debt  1      536   0.030 1.58 0.041 1.26 0.02 3.73 0.762 0.016 0.40 
   Reduction  2      352   -0.009 -0.34 0.066 1.26 0.01 1.19 0.184 -0.006  0.52 
  3      241   0.020 0.32 0.044 0.46 -0.01 -0.60 0.846 0.014  0.57 
  4      193   0.046 0.48 -0.057 -0.53 0.00 -0.16 0.506 0.039  0.64 
          
 Panel C: Asia          



















asset    total
capital secondary 
ln
0 ln[asset] p-value    
V t  N  β1  t-stat  β2  t-stat  β3  t-stat  β1= β2 $change R
2 
        
∑CAPEX  1      355   0.152 2.20 -0.063 -1.17 0.00 0.80 0.058 0.142 0.64 
  2      221   0.550 4.28 -0.042 -0.21 -0.01 -0.75 0.046 0.563 0.76 
  3      143   0.826 3.09 -0.351 -1.09 -0.03 -1.58 0.028 0.950 0.85 
  4      119   1.223 2.77 -0.627 -1.15 -0.06 -1.51 0.039 1.534 0.85 
                
∑R&D  1      178   0.023 0.89 -0.027 -0.73 0.00 -1.59 0.300 0.021  0.58 
  2      130   -0.001 -0.08 0.087 1.38 0.00 -0.48 0.201 -0.001  0.69 
  3      105   0.010 0.36 0.243 1.70 0.00 -0.66 0.141 0.009  0.75 
  4        89   -0.014 -0.36 0.572 2.02 0.00 0.00 0.065 -0.014  0.78 
                
∆Cash  1      667   0.763 6.65 -0.058 -0.45 0.00 0.63 0.000 0.718 0.76 
  2      522   0.509 3.87 0.025 0.11 0.00 -0.32 0.102 0.506 0.53 
  3      401   0.562 3.38 -0.066 -0.26 -0.01 -0.64 0.069 0.571 0.56 
  4      334   0.444 2.60 0.186 0.99 -0.02 -2.17 0.398 0.442 0.58 
                
∑LT Debt  1      180   0.095 2.10 -0.114 -1.39 0.00 -0.30 0.046 0.085 0.52 
   Reduction  2      107   0.192 2.90 -0.166 -1.20 0.00 0.16 0.043 0.176 0.73 
  3        75   0.234 1.27 -0.235 -1.01 0.01 0.35 0.241 0.214  0.82 




Table V  Continued 
 
 Panel D: Common Legal Origin      



















asset    total
capital secondary 
ln
0 ln[asset] p-value    
V t  N  β1  t-stat  β2  t-stat  β3  t-stat  β1= β2 $change R
2 
                 
∑CAPEX  1    3,916   0.157 14.12 0.010 0.77 0.01 1.72 0.000 0.078 0.57 
  2    3,382   0.338 17.44 0.066 2.84 0.01 2.26 0.000 0.198 0.67 
  3    2,708   0.413 14.76 0.087 2.51 0.02 1.97 0.000 0.298 0.70 
  4    2,143   0.453 11.07 0.118 2.53 0.01 1.00 0.000 0.381 0.71 
                
∑R&D  1    2,506   0.290 21.42 0.003 0.15 0.01 1.74 0.000 0.156 0.75 
  2    2,175   0.533 24.13 0.020 0.69 0.02 2.30 0.000 0.376 0.82 
  3    1,717   0.677 20.84 0.057 1.40 0.03 2.56 0.000 0.629 0.84 
  4    1,329   0.741 16.55 0.094 1.68 0.02 1.14 0.000 0.880 0.84 
                
∆Cash  1    3,960   0.910 48.77 0.160 5.70 0.03 5.58 0.000 0.698 0.86 
  2    3,448   0.778 28.87 0.238 5.83 0.05 6.44 0.000 0.570 0.71 
  3    2,789   0.707 17.68 0.300 5.97 0.05 4.76 0.000 0.515 0.60 
  4    2,227   0.635 12.46 0.296 4.99 0.03 2.59 0.000 0.482 0.54 
                
∑LT Debt  1    3,782   0.077 5.00 -0.027 -1.26 0.03 5.64 0.000 0.041 0.41 
   Reduction  2    3,239   0.095 4.48 -0.073 -2.34 0.03 4.12 0.000 0.056 0.46 
  3    2,575   0.092 3.20 -0.149 -3.28 0.03 2.50 0.000 0.066 0.48 
  4    2,024   0.120 2.89 -0.215 -3.52 0.02 1.45 0.000 0.096 0.51 
          
 Panel E: Civil Legal Origin      



















asset    total
capital secondary 
ln
0 ln[asset] p-value    
V t  N  β1  t-stat  β2  t-stat  β3  t-stat  β1= β2 $change R
2 
        
∑CAPEX  1    1,105   0.105 4.71 0.026 1.31 -0.01 -1.54 0.012 0.086 0.44 
  2      845   0.146 4.80 0.072 2.31 -0.03 -3.67 0.076 0.142 0.60 
  3      558   0.159 3.07 0.067 1.20 -0.05 -3.97 0.135 0.172 0.69 
  4      369   0.217 2.61 0.167 1.93 -0.06 -3.34 0.652 0.251 0.76 
                
∑R&D  1      283   0.133 4.11 0.016 0.44 -0.02 -2.39 0.002 0.109 0.71 
  2      198   0.307 3.59 0.136 1.30 -0.04 -2.08 0.139 0.260 0.82 
  3      151   0.265 1.79 0.057 0.24 -0.08 -3.11 0.316 0.269 0.82 
  4      124   0.315 1.49 0.510 1.39 -0.13 -2.73 0.515 0.367 0.83 
                
∆Cash  1    1,498   0.712 21.38 0.227 6.90 -0.01 -1.39 0.000 0.646 0.83 
  2    1,216   0.533 11.51 0.146 2.93 -0.02 -2.59 0.000 0.528 0.63 
  3      862   0.363 6.22 0.214 2.25 -0.02 -1.96 0.090 0.382 0.52 
  4      607   0.342 5.79 0.087 0.84 -0.04 -3.48 0.011 0.377 0.47 
                
∑LT Debt  1      433   0.021 1.04 -0.012 -0.56 0.01 1.46 0.288 0.017 0.49 
   Reduction  2      287   -0.006 -0.20 0.021 0.35 0.00 -0.33 0.707 -0.005  0.58 
  3      204   0.123 1.63 0.104 0.61 -0.01 -0.36 0.906 0.098  0.66 





Subsequent Equity Offerings following IPOs by IPO Offer Type 
This table presents the total proceeds and new capital raised through SEOs within 2 years of an IPO.  The table reports the amount separately 
for each of the 3 IPO types.  The total proceeds and new capital from IPOs are also provided for comparison.  The last 7 columns show the 
number of SEOs by SEO offer type and also by IPO offer type.  The sample period is from 1990 to 2003.  
 
IPOs    SEOs within 2 years 
IPO    Total  New    Total  New      Number of SEOs by offer type 
primary only  secondary only combined  Offer 
Type    amount 
(A) 
capital 
(B)  B/A  amount 
(C) 
capital 
(D)  D/C   
 
Total 
(N)  (Np) Np/N (Ns)N s/N (Nc)N c/N
                
primary 
only   371,115  371,115  100.0% 136,714 76,406 55.9% 2,386  1,542  65% 320 13% 524 22%
             
secondary 
only   42,526  -  0.0% 13,496 810 6.0% 56  15 27% 36 64% 5 9%
             
combined  207,368  122,054  58.9% 85,025 32,981 38.8% 983  312  32% 252 26% 419 43%
             
Total   621,009  493,169  79.4% 235,235 110,197 46.8% 3,425  1,869 55% 608 18% 948 28%





The Effect of IPO Offer Type on Subsequent Issuances of Equity  
This table presents logit and Tobit results measuring the effect of IPO offer type on subsequent 
issuances of equity.  The independent variables are the same as in table IV.  The dependent 
variable for Panel A-1 takes value 1 if there is at least 1 new capital raising activity within 2 years 
of an IPO, and 0 otherwise.  In Panel A-2, the dependent variable is the amount of new capital 
raised within 2 years normalized by total assets, and in Panel A-3, the number of SEOs that raised 
new capital. Panels B-1, B-2, and B-3 correspond to Panels A-1, A-2 and A-3, where new capital 
is replaced with sale of secondary shares at SEOs.  All regressions include year, country, and 
industry (2 digit SIC) fixed effects (not reported).  p-values are from testing β1 = β2. Bold letters 
indicate statistical significance at less than 5%.  Logit uses heteroscedasticity consistent standard 
errors.  The sample period for this table is from 1990 to 2001. 
 
Panel A-1(logit): Probability of Raising Fresh Capital within 2 years of an IPO 
     Explanatory Variables       

























ln[asset] p-value  Pseudo
IPO type  N  β1  t-stat  β2  t-stat  β3  t-stat  β1=β2 R
2 
all 3 types  5,797  0.045  0.56  0.031  0.25  0.061 2.18  0.926 0.07 
combined only  2,024  0.437 2.67 -0.212 -0.99 0.057 1.05 0.035  0.06 
                  




shares   total





asset    total
proceeds   total
ln
 
ln[asset]    
all 3 types  5,797  0.552 3.21  0.007 0.16  0.064 2.24    0.07 
combined only  2,024  1.098 3.37  0.143 1.77  0.075  1.29    0.06 
                   


























ln[asset] p-value  Pseudo
   N  β1  t-stat  β2  t-stat  β3  t-stat  β1=β2 R
2 
all 3 types  5,797  0.335 4.70  0.132 1.19  0.039  1.46 0.122  0.06 
combined only  2,024  0.596 4.52  0.013 0.08  0.032  0.70 0.015  0.07 
                  




shares   total





asset    total
proceeds   total
ln
 
ln[asset]    
all 3 types  5,797  0.547 3.29  0.151 3.70  0.038 1.31    0.06 
combined only  2,024  0.715 2.71  0.248 3.77  0.026 0.54    0.07 
                  


























ln[asset] p-value  Pseudo
   N  β1  t-stat  β2  t-stat  β3  t-stat  β1=β2 R
2 
all 3 types  5,797  -0.007  -0.08  0.000 0.00 0.059 2.03  0.962 0.06 
combined only  2,024  0.320 2.08 -0.122 -0.66 0.063 1.21  0.115  0.06 
                  




shares   total





asset    total
proceeds   total
ln
 
ln[asset]    
all 3 types  5,797  0.530 3.02 -0.032 -0.75 0.055 1.78    0.06 




Table VII  Continued 
 
Panel B-1(logit): Probability of Selling Secondary Shares within 2 years of an IPO 
     Explanatory Variables       

























ln[asset] p-value  Pseudo
IPO type  N  β1  t-stat  β2  t-stat  β3  t-stat  β1=β2 R
2 
all 3 types  5,797   0.263 2.94  0.763 6.28 0.348 11.29  0.001  0.10 
combined only  2,024   0.322  1.89  0.320  1.57  0.293 5.19  0.995 0.08 
                  




shares   total





asset    total
proceeds   total
ln
 
ln[asset]   
all 3 types  5,797   -0.576 -3.44 0.310 6.20 0.412 12.15    0.10 
combined only  2,024   -0.058 -0.19 0.331 3.96 0.350 5.69    0.08 
                 


























ln[asset] p-value  Pseudo
   N  β1  t-stat  β2  t-stat  β3  t-stat  β1=β2 R
2 
all 3 types  5,797   0.399 5.71  0.721 7.46 0.267 10.10  0.006 0.09 
combined only  2,024   0.528 4.37  0.409 2.88 0.222 5.32  0.580 0.09 
                  




shares   total





asset    total
proceeds   total
ln
 
ln[asset]   
all 3 types  5,797   -0.360 -2.67 0.353 8.60 0.321 11.07    0.09 
combined only  2,024   -0.107 -0.47 0.405 6.53 0.243 5.51    0.09 
                  


























ln[asset] p-value  Pseudo
   N  β1  t-stat  β2  t-stat  β3  t-stat  β1=β2 R
2 
all 3 types  5,797   0.185 2.25  0.654 5.71 0.330 10.90  0.001 0.08 
combined only  2,024   0.204  1.43  0.307 1.83 0.273 5.76  0.684 0.07 
                  




shares   total





asset    total
proceeds   total
ln
 
ln[asset]   
all 3 types  5,797   -0.468 -3.05 0.254 5.49 0.388 11.72  0.09 
combined only  2,024   -0.175 -0.67 0.250 3.60 0.308 6.17  0.08 
 